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Introduction
The  role  of international  trade  and factor  movements  in the  process  of  economic  development
of  developing  countries  (LDC's)  has  continued  to attract  the attention  of economic
theorists,  policymakers,  and chroniclers  of economic  development.  While  it  is  too  much  to
expect  a consensus  view of  this role  to  emerge  based  on the  confrontation  of alternative
theories  with the  development  experience  of many  countries  since  the Second  World  War,  it
is fair  to say that  (1) the  divergence  of views  has  narrowed  and  (2)  the  proponents  of
alternative  views  are able  to support  them by  drawing  upon  (albeit  selectively)  an
impressive  accumulation  of analytical  and  empirical  studies.
The past  25  years  have  witnessed  a sea-change  in the  world  economic  system:  the  nations  of
the world  have  become  more  interdependent  both  in the  sense  that a  larger  proportion  of
world output is  traded  in  world  markets and  that world  capital  markets  have  become
integrated  to a considerable  extent.  The  system  has absorbed  significant  shocks:  the
collapse  of the  Brettonwoods  system of fixed  exchange  rates,  the  two  massive  oil  price
increase in  1973  and  1979,  the  related phenomena  of recessions  in industrialized  countries,
and  the  unprecedented  increase  in real interest  rates.  Whether  the recent  fall  in  oil
prices  and interest  rates  will  sustain  the ongoing  recovery  and  help  the  oil  importers  or
whether  it will  end  it through  its effect on  some  oil exporting  countries  (mainly  the
heavily  indebted  ones)  and  the  capital  exporters  is too  soon  to  tell.  Be  that  as  it  may,
the experiences  of countries  that followed  development  strategies  with  different  foreign
trade  orientation  in adjusting  to external  economic  shocks  provide  an  unusual  opportunity
for assessing  the  strengths and  weakness  of  the strategies  pursued.
Since  the Second  World  War,  we  witnessed  several  rounds  of multilateral  negotiations  and
agreements  for reducing  the  tariff and  nontariff  barriers  to  international  trade.  Numerous
innovations  in  reducing  political  and  other  risks  involved  in foreign  investment  have  also
taken place.  Also,  a set of proposals  for  a New  International  Economic  Order  (NIEO)  was
put forward  by  the developing  countries  in  the  second  half  of  the seventies.  The  so-called
North-South  negotiations  between  the developed  (north)  and  developing  (south)  countries  on
these proposals  have  been  held  off  and  on since  then.  While  a  few  of these  proposals  were
accepted  by  the north  in  some diluted  form,  all of them  have  been  the  subject  of a  number
of  studies,  which by  and  large conclude  that  most  developing  countries  were  unlikely  to
benefit from  the  proposals,  if they  benefit  at  all.  For  all intents  and  purposes,  these
proposals  are  dead,  if not yet  buried.
Beside  the  shocks  and  shifts  in  the global  economic  system of the  past  25  years,  there  have
also  been  significant  additions  to the  analytical  toolkit of  economists  in  general  and
development  economists  in  particular.  Some  of the  analytical  problems  that were  once
thought  to be peculiar  to development  economics  have  now  become  part of the  mainstream.
Advances  in economic  theory,  in  particular,  the attempts  to  provide  a more  satisfactory
1This paper with  minor editorial changes  is  a reprint of the same titled paper in P. Schultz  and  G.  Rains  (eds.),  The
State of Development  Economics:  Progress and Perspectives  published by Basil  Blackwell.  We  appreciate the permission
of the publisher, author, and editors to reprint this article.
2The  author  is  the  Samuel  C.  Park,  Jr.,  Professor  of  Economics,  Department  of  Economics,  Economic
Growth  Center,  Yale  University,  Hartford,  CN.  I  thank  Bela  Balassa,  Willem  Buiter,  Michael  Jones,  Kenneth
Kletzer,  Pradeep  Mitra,  and  Gustav  Ranis  for  their  valuable  comments  on  an  earlier  draft.theory  of  expectation  formations  and  (microeconomic)  foundations  for  macroeconomics;  the
development  of  models  incorporating  features  of  industrial  organization  theory  in  analyzing
problems  of  international  trade;  and  analysis  of  the  implications  of  viewing  nonmarket
institutions  and  processes  as  serving  the  functions  of  nonexistent  or  imperfectly
functioning  markets  in  a  context  of  asymmetric  information,  moral  hazard,  and  adverse
selection  have  all  influenced  development  theorizing.  There  has  been  an  enormous  increase
in  the  quantity  (if  not  to  the  same  extent  in  the  quality)  of  economic  data  on  developing
countries.  At  the  same  time,  a  vast  array  of  new  econometric  tools  and  the  computational
capacity  to  use  them  have  become  available,  enabling  analysts  to  use  simulation  with
empirical  models  as  a  technique  for  understanding  the  implications  of  complex  policy
scenarios  and  shocks  to  the  system.  This  is  a  task  that  is  not  easy  to  accomplish  only
with  a  priori  theorizing  even  of  the  most  sophisticated  kind.
The  developments  in  the  world  economy,  in  empirically  modeling,  the  functions  of  the
economic  system,  and  simulating  the  effects  of  counter-factual  policy  variants  and  other
shocks  to  the  system  have  been  substantial.  It  is  impossible  to  discuss  them  in  a  coherent
manner  in  one  paper,  even  if  one  were,  indeed,  equipped  to  do  so.  I  took  a  more  modest
approach  and  reviewed  only  a  few  theoretical  advances  and  empirical  studies  relating  to
international  trade  and  factor  movements.
The  Foreign  Sector  in  Development  Strategy
Foreign  trade  has  been  viewed  as  a lead sector  in development  strategy  for some  time.  The
perception  of the  role  of trade  has  changed  over  time.
Early Perceptions  and  Subsequent  Experience
It is  useful  to  begin  with  some  facts  at  the  aggregate  level.  Contrary  to  the  widespread
belief  in the  immediate  post-World  War II  years that the  prospects  were  dim  for substantial
growth  in  world  trade  and of per  capita  income  of the  poor countries,  the  realized  growth
was  remarkable.  However,  it  is  too soon  to  assess whether  the growth  path of  the
pre-first-oil-shock  period  has  been  restored  since  1984  (tables  1 and  2).  The  realized
average  growth  rate  of per  capita income  over  1950-83  at about  3  percent  per annum  exceeded
by  a third  the growth  rate  achieved  by  most of today's  industrialized  countries  over  the
century  ending  in  1960.  Equally,  if not more  impressive,  is the  fact that  the  volume  of
world  trade  as  a  whole  grew faster  than world  gross domestic  product  (GDP).  Trade  in
primary  products (agriculture  and mineral)  seems  to  have  grown  faster than  the  growth  in
their output.  This  aggregate  picture  masks  substantial  variations  among  countries  and,  in
part,  can  be  explained  by  their  policies.  Nevertheless,  the  pessimistic  perspective  on  the
elasticity  of trade  with  respect  to output  and  income  that colored  early  development
theorizing  and  policymaking  has  been  clearly  belied by  history.
This  pessimism  led  to  the  identification  of a shortage  of  foreign  exchange  as  one  of  the
key  (if  not the sole)  constraints  on  economic  development.  Cairncross  put the  dominant
view succinctly:  "The majority  of the  underdeveloped  countries  are monocultures,  dependent
for  their earnings of foreign  exchange  on a single  commodity  (or  at  most two  or three).
These  earnings  are highly  inelastic  except  when exports  of the  principal commodity  form  a
small fraction  of the  world's  consumption.  At the  same  time,  nearly  all  the  plant and
machinery  that they require  has  to  be  imported,  so  that  the scale  of industrial  development
is  limited by  the  foreign  exchange  available  to pay  for it" (22)*.  It is  indeed  ironic
that  this  view of a single  primary commodity  export  with (income)  inelastic  foreign demand
3Underscored  numbers  in parentheses  are listed in the  References  at  the end of this article.Table 1--Growth  of world merchandise trade  and  production
Annual  rate of  change
Item  1963-73  1973-83  1984
Exports:  Percent
All merchandise  9.0  3.0  9.0
Agricultural products  4.0  3.0  7.0
Minerals  7.5  -2.0  3.0
Manufacturers  11.5  4.5  12.0
Production:
All  merchandise  6.0  2.0  5.5
Agriculture  2.5  2.0  5.0
Minerals  5.5  0.5  2.0
Manufacturing  7.5  2.5  7.5
Share of  developing countries:  1963  1973  1984
In  world exports  20.5  19.0  24.5
In  worLd  imports  21.0  18.0  23.5
Source:  (30,  pp.  4-6).
Table 2--Growth  of  per capita  real  gross domestic product
Item  1955-70  1965-73  1973-80  1981  1982  1983  1984  1/  1985  2/
Annual  rate of growth
ALL  developing countries  3.1  4.1  3.2  1.0  -0.7  0  3.3  2.4
Low-income countries  1.6  3.0  2.7  3.0  3.2  6.1  7.4  6.1
Major  exporters  of
manufactures  3.9  4.6  3.1  -. 8  -2.0  -1.6  1.8  1.0
Oil  importers  3.2  -..--
Oil  exporters  3.4  4.6  3.4  1.5  -2.8  -4.4  .7  0
High-income oil  exporters  5.8  4.1  5.9  -. 7  -7.6  -15.7  -3.0  -8.5
Industrial market  economies  3.6  3.7  2.1  -1.1  -1.3  1.6  3.9  2.4
--  =  Not  avaiLable
1/  Projected on the basis  of GDP.
2/  Estimated.
Source:  (75,  table 3.1  for  1982 and; table A.2  for 1986).
constraining  the  imports  of  capital  goods  needed  (often  in  fixed  proportion  to  output)  for
industrial  development  continues  to  underpin  some  of  the  recent  structuralist  North-South
models.  This  suggests  that  some  form  of  theorizing  is  unlikely  to  be  influenced  by
inconvenient  facts.
Evolution  of  Analytical  Models:  Two  Gaps  to  Applied  General  Equilibrium
The  early  development  models  of  (Chenery  and  Bruno,  Chenery  and  Strout)  encapsulated  a
rigid  foreign  exchange  gap  (in  addition  to  a  domestic  savings  gap)  that  can  prove  to  be  a
binding  constraint  on  development,  given  the  assumed  exogeneity  of  export  earnings  (24,
25).  When  the  exchange  gap  was  binding,  which  implied  that  there  was  a  realizable  but
unrealized  pool  of  domestic  savings,  foreign  aid  became  twice  blessed,  once  for  relieving
the  constraint  on  imports  of  capital  goods  and  once  again  by  realizing  the  potential
domestic  savings  and  converting  it  (together  with  aid  financed  equipment  imports)  into
productive  capacity  in  the  form  of  plant  and  equipment.
In  time,  the  two-gap  models  begat  a  generation  of  multisector  development  planning  models.
The  analytics  of  these  models  were  summarized  by  Blitzer,  Clark,  and  Taylor  (18).  Some
limited  input  substitution  in  production  was  included  in  these  models  in  the  form  of
alternative  activities  that  used  inputs  in  different  but  fixed  proportions.  Even  more
limited  commodity  substitution  in  demand  was  allowed  in  an  ad  hoc  way.The  choice  among  alternative  production  and  consumption  activities  was  the  consequence  of
the  optimization  of  the  specified  objective  functions  of  these  models.  Put  in  another  way,
their  choice  was  not  necessarily  the  result  of  the  response  of  producers,  consumers,  and
traders  to  the  relevant  prices  and  constraints  faced  by  them.  It  was  as  if  these  agents
faced  the  "shadow  prices"  associated  with  the  "optimum"  solution  to  the  model,  and  their
actual  decision  environment  was  adequately  described  in  the  model.
Implicit  in  this  was  also  the  belief,  though  not  necessarily  shared  by  all  modelers,  that
the  planner  (such  as,  the  state)  had  enough  fiscal  and  other  instruments  in  his  arsenal  to
assure  that  the  "shadow  prices"  were  in  fact  the  actual  prices  faced  by  consumers  and
producers.  Thus,  a  purposive  planner,  imbued  with  the  long-term  interests  of  the  society,
having  an  appropriately  formulated  model  of  the  economy,  was  supposed  to  use  the  model  as  a
tool  to  analyze  the  implications  of  alternative  strategies  and  policies  and  arrive  at  the
most  suitable  (if  not  the  optimal)  strategy  together  with  a  description  of  taxes,
subsidies,  and  other  items  needed  to  implement  the  strategy.  It  must  be  added,  however,
that  the  more  perceptive  planners  did  not  share  this  view  of  the  modeling  exercise.  They
viewed  the  models  only  as  a  computationally  convenient  but  necessarily  rough
approximations,  which  were  far  more  useful  than  other  methods  to  check  the  internal
consistency  of  alternative  plan  proposals.  They  rightly  believed  that  the  planning  models
cannot  eliminate  the  role  of  judgment  in  making  hard  political  and  socioeconomic  choices.
Forgetting  this  important  fact  can  lead  to  unfortunate  consequences.  For  example,  Rosen
(56)  provides  a  fascinating  account  of  the  entanglement  in  Indian  politics  of  a,  in  many
ways,  pioneering,  planning  model  put  together  in  the  sixties  by  Indian  and  foreign
economists  working  for  the  Center  for  International  Studies  at  Massachusetts  Institute  of
Technology  (MIT).
The  capacity  to  build  an  empirical  analogue  of  a  price-endogenous  Walrasian  General
Equilibrium  Model  (WGEM)  and  algorithms  to  compute  its  equilibrium  became  available  in  the
midseventies.  This  new  model  of  applied  general  equilibrium  analysis  was  quickly  put  to
use  for  analyzing  domestic  fiscal  policies  in  a  number  of  countries  by  Shoven  Whalley  (61).
Their  multicountry  variants  have  been  used  to  analyze  foreign  trade  policies,  particularly
unilateral  and  multilateral  trade  liberalization.  Such  models  have  been  put  together  for
several  developing  countries,  largely  under  the  sponsorship  of  the  World  Bank.  At  the
International  Institute  for  Applied  Systems  Analysis  (IIASA)  in  Austria,  a  model  was
prepared  from  the  pioneering  effort  of  Adelman  and  Robinson  (1).4
The  attractions  of  such  a  model  are obvious  enough:  not only  the allocative  efficiency
implications  of  policies  that  distort the  equilibrium  set  of market  prices  can  be  analysed,
but  through  their effect  on  equilibrium  returns  to  primary  factors,  the  income
distributional  implications  can  be  drawn  as  well.  Provided  one  is  willing  to  specify  the
processes  of  formation  of  price  expectations,  accumulation  of  primary  factors  and  of
technical  change,  a  sequence  (in time)  of equilibria  can  be computed  as  well.  Elements  of
such  a sequence  are  not,  of course,  components  of an intertemporal  competitive  equilibrium
but  simply of Hicksian  temporary  equilibria.  Thus,  static  as  well  as  dynamic  efficiency
and equity  implications  of  alternative  development  strategies  could  be  analyzed  or  so it
was  hoped.  Clive  Bell and  I  critically  examined  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  such
models  for understanding  the development  processes  (6).  These  models  have  been far more
useful  in examining  issues of allocation  and efficiency  than as  tools  for analyzing
processes.
The evolution  of  another useful  tool,  namely,  social  cost benefit  analysis,  for  analyzing
choice  at the sectoral  and  project level  rather than  at the  economy-wide  level  needs  to  be
4It is  interesting that  the earliest  empirical planning  model for  any developing  country  was  by  Sandee  (60)  for
India.  However,  a price endogenous  model  for India came years  after Adelman  and Robinson's  for Korea,  as if the
attitudes of policymakers  toward prices  and markets in  the two  countries influenced  the modelers  (1).briefly  noted.  Cost  benefit  analysis  as  a  tool  for  making  public  investment  choice  is  not
a  new  development.  Its  refinement,  however,  to  incorporate  a  wide  spectrum  of  social
objectives  (including  those  relating  to  the  distribution of  income  along  socioeconomic
groups  at  a  point  in  time  and  over  time)  and  the  derivation  of  procedures  for  the
evaluation  of  individual  projects  from  an  explicit  or  implicit  economy-wide  model  indeed
are  new.  Such  derivation  can  be  linked  to  the  evolution  of  economy-wide  models.  Simply
stated,  the  problem  of  project  evaluation  is  to  arrive  at  a  set  of  social  or  shadow  prices
to  inputs  and  outputs  of  a  project  during  its  lifetime  so  that  the  net  present  value  of  the
project  at  these  prices  indicates  its  social-welfare  impact.  Analogous  to  the  use  of
simple  models  such  as  the  two-gap  model,  there  were  attempts  to  derive  shadow  pricing
formulas  for  a  few  key  factors  such  as  unskilled  labor,  capital,  and  foreign  exchange.  As
the  simple  one  and  two  sector  models  evolved  into  multisector,  multiperiod  programming
variants,  the  shadow  prices  for  inputs  and  outputs  associated  with  the  optimum  solution  to
the  economy-wide  programming  problem  suggested  themselves  as  the  relevant  ones  for  use  in
project  evaluation.  Unfortunately,  apart from  the  conceptual  problem  that  each  ad  hoc
constraint  introduced  to  approximate  some  aspect  of  reality,  the  programming  model  acquired
a  shadow  price  that  was  not  easily  interpretable and  usable  in  a  project  evaluation
context.
As  it  turned  out,  the  shadow  price  vector  was  not  very  robust  even  to  minor  changes  in  the
specification  of  the  model.  By  viewing  a  project  as  a  small  perturbation  of  an  initial
equilibrium,  one  could  derive  project  evaluation  criteria  from  the  applied  general
equilibrium  models  as  well.  The  same  robustness  problem  with  respect  to  model
specification  arises  in  this  case  also.  Workable  procedures  of  evaluation  have  to  be
robust,  theoretically  sound,  and  simple  in  computation.  The  two  basic  project  evaluation
guidebooks  emerged  from  a  search  for  workable  procedures,  namely,  the  OECD  manual  authored
by  Little  and  Mirrlees  (46)  and  the  UNIDO  guidelines  authored  by  Dasgupta,  Marglin,  and  Sen
(26).  A  central  result  of  these  manuals  is  that for  a  small  open  economy  (that  is  an
economy  that cannot  influence  the  relative  prices  of  internationally  traded  goods)  shadow
prices  for  traded  goods  are  their  "border" prices  (that  is,  f.o.b.  prices  for  exports  and
c.i.f.  prices  for  imports).  The  shadow  prices  for  nontraded  goods  and  primary  factors  can
often  be  derived  from  traded  goods  prices.  These  results  are  fairly  robust  (as  long  as  the
economy  is  a  price  taker in  world  markets  and  distortions  are  not  due  to  quantitative
interventions,  such  as  import  quotas)  and  can  be  rigorously  derived  from  a  general
equilibrium  model  of  the  economy  (62);  thus,  making  the  procedure  theoretically  sound.
Since  border  prices  for  traded  goods  are  readily  available  and  the  procedure  for  deriving
other  prices  usually  requires  no  more  than  an  input-output  table,  the  procedure  is  easily
implemented.
Outward-  and  Inward-Oriented  Development  Strategies
The  early  pessimism  with  respect  to  foreign  demand  for  exports  was  partially  based  on  the
dismal  experience  with  foreign  trade  during  the  inter-war  period  in  general  and  the
depression  period  in  particular.  This  pessimism,  apart  from  its  impact  on  analytical
modeling  of  development,  was  a  major  reason  for  many  developing  countries  to  adopt  an
"inward-oriented" strategy  of  development  in  spite  of  the  potential  static  and  dynamic
gains  of  an  "outward-oriented" strategy.  To  avoid  the  misidentification  of  outward
orientation  either  with  active  export  promotion  or  with  laissez-faire,  let  me  define  an
outward-oriented  strategy  as  one  that  has  no  significant  bias,  first  toward  autarkic
development,  or  second  toward  either  export  promotion  (earning  of  foreign  exchange)  or
import  substitution  (saving  of  foreign  exchange).  Many  countries  adopted  a  development
strategy  that  was  biased  toward  import  substitution  (beyond  what  would  occur  if  dictates  of
comparative  advantages  were  followed).  They  also  implemented  it  through  a  regime  of
quantitative  restrictions  on  imports  and  exports  of  goods  and  services,  domestic  and
foreign  investment,  and  imports  of  technology.  Tariffs  and  price  interventions  were  not
altogether  absent.  The  failure  of  this  strategy  was  becoming  clear  by  the  midsixties.
Although  few  countries  abandoned  it  altogether,  several  countries  experimented  withliberalizing  their  foreign  trade  and  payments  regimes.  These  liberalization  episodes  as
well  as  the  claims  of  rapid industrialization  (enhanced  investment  rates,  greater
employment  creation,  and  faster  technical  progress  made  in  favor  of  the  inward-oriented
strategy)  were  examined  in  a  number  of  theoretical  and  empirical  studies  in  the  late
seventies  (2,9,16,41,42).
Very  few  of  the  claims  made  for  inward  orientation  were  supported  by  the  experience  of  the
countries  studied.  The  strong  conclusion  emerging  from  these  studies  is  simply  that  trade
liberalization  is  beneficial  and  the  performance  of  countries  that  either  switched  to,  or
pursued  from  early  on,  a  version  of  the  outward-oriented  strategy  far  outstripped  that  of
others.  Bhagwati  persuasively  argues  that  the  attribution  of  success  of  the
outward-oriented  strategy  for  eastern  countries  (such  as  Singapore,  Taiwan,  and  South
Korea)  to  their  authoritarian  regimes  is  simply  an  assertion  without  any  convincing
evidence  to  support  it  (II).
An  apparently  unfavorable  assessment  of  outward  orientation  emerges  from  studies  of  trade
liberalization,  using  the  newer  tool  of  applied  general  equilibrium  modeling.  Whalley  (73)
and  Srinivasan  and  Whalley  (65)  report  on  several  of  these  studies.  Since  the  results  of
most  studies  are  similar,  let  me  draw  on  Whalley  (73)  for  illustration.  His  model
distinguishes  seven  regions:  the  United  States,  EC,  Japan,  other  developed  countries  (ODC),
Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC),  newly  industrializing  countries
(NIC's),  and  less  developed  countries  (LDC).  Six  aggregate  products  are  produced  in  each
region  with  five  of  them  being  internationally  traded.  He  makes  four  counter-factual
simulations  or  scenarios.  He  included  in  the  first  scenario  only  the  northern  regions
(United  States,  EC,  Japan;  and  ODC),  in  the  second  scenario  only  the  southern  regions
(OPEC,  NIC's  and  LDC),  and  in  the  third scenario,  all  seven  regions  abolished  tariff  and
nontariff  barriers.  In  the  fourth  scenario,  the  southern  regions  grew  faster  in  the
post-1978  period  than  the  northern regions  did  in  the  pre-1978  period.  The  welfare  impact
of  liberalization  is  assessed  by  Hicksian  Equivalent  Variation  of  income.  The  results  are
shown  in  table  3.
The  global  gains  to  trade  liberalization  are  extremely  modest,  varying  from  0.28
percent  of  1977  GNP  in  scenarios  1  and  2  to  0.36  percent  in  scenario  3  when  the  whole  world
achieves  the  Nirvana  of  free  trade.  The  NIC's-LDC  group  lose  almost  5  percent  of  their  GDP
by  unilaterally  liberalizing  and  about  4  percent  when  the  rest  of  the  world  joins  them  in
liberalizing.  As  in  scenario  4,  if  the  southern  regions  continue  to  grow  faster  and
attempt  to  catch  up  with  the  northern regions,  their  terms  of  trade  deteriorate.  Should  we
conclude  from  this  that outward  orientation  makes  only  a  marginal  difference  to  world
welfare  but  definitely  harms  the  LDC's  and  NIC's?
I  argued  elsewhere  that  such  a  conclusion  would  be  wrong  for  several  reasons  (64).  These
reasons  include  the  competitive  general  equilibrium  features  of  the  models,  particularly
their  inadequacy  in  capturing  the  necessarily  forward-looking  and  dynamic  processes  of
factor  accumulation  and  technical  change,  and  their  manipulation  of  data  (as  well  as  the
specification  of  crucial  elasticity  parameters)  to  make  them  an  internally  consistent
equilibrium  set.  I  wish  to  emphasize  two  features  that  are  likely  to  understate  the  gains
from  outward  orientation  in  developing  countries.  The  first  relates  to  the  fact  that  the
models  assume  rent-seeking  activities  triggered  by  policy  instruments  used  in  implementing
an  inward-oriented  strategy.  Such  rent  seeking  diverts  resources  away  from  producing  goods
and  services  demanded  by  final  consumers,  a  diversion  that  will  by  definition  disappear
with  liberalization.  The  second  is  the  assumption  that production  takes  place  under
constant  returns  to  scale  technologies  and  competitive  market  structures.  Yet,  the
policies  (particularly  those  relating  to  the  industrial sector  such  as  investment  licensing
and  allocation  of  capital  goods  imports)  used  to  sustain  inward  orientation  restrict
competition  not  only  from  imports  but  also  among  domestic  producers.  In  fact,  they  create
domestic  oligopolies  and  even  monopolies  besides  establishing  high-cost  domestic  capacity
of  nonoptimal  scale  for  the  production  of  import  substitutes.  Again,  gains  fromTable  3--Welfare  impact  of  trade  -Liberalization  secnarios  and
terms-of-trade  impact of  differential  growth
Gross  Scenario
Region  national
product  1  2  3
Bi llion
1977 dollars  - - - - - - - Percent  - - - -
EC  1,629  -3.1  37.2  33.1
United States  1,897  -. 1  12.1  10.7
Japan  734  -. 1  12.1  10.7
ODC  2,024  3.4  4.5  5.6
OPEC  303  1.7  7.0  4.4
NIC's  461  9.2  -31.6  -24.3
LDC  773  11.8  -28.2  -23.0
World  7,824  22.1  22.0  27.8
Annual  Terms-of-trade change relative to base case
growth
rate  After  After  After
5  years  10  years  20  years
Percent
EC  3.3  3.4  6.8  13.9
United States  2.8  3.4  6.9  14.0
Japan  4.8  -3.4  -6.7  -13.1
ODC  4.1  -2.8  -5.7  -11.1
OPEC  3.5  .9  1.8  3.5
NIC's  5.2  -4.6  -8.9  -17.2
LDC  4.5  -3.1  -6.1  -12.1
Source:  (72,  tables 4 and 5).
liberalization  arising  from the  elimination  of deadweight  losses  due  to  imperfect
competition  are not  captured  by  the models.
There are  two  studies  that estimate  the  gains  from liberalizing  an  economy  in  which  rent
seeking  or imperfect  competition  is  prevalent.  The  first  by  Grais,  Demelo,  and  Urata
models  the rent  seeking  associated  with import  quotas  in the  Turkish  economy  (31).  It
finds  that while  the  gain to the  removal  of tariffs only  (while  keeping  the quotas  intact)
was  negligible,  the  removal  of quotas  increased  real GDP  compared  with its  base  or
reference  value  between  5 and  10  percent.  The  second  study by  Harris  was  on  Canada's
economies  of  scale and imperfect  competition  (33).  He found  that Canada's  participation  in
a multilateral  reduction of  all tariffs  yield  a welfare  gain  in excess  of  5 percent  of  GNP.
Outward  Orientation  and Adjustment  to  External  Shocks
In  the literature  on  the  role  of international  trade  and  development,  it  is  sometimes
argued  that outward  orientation  may expose  a developing  economy  to  disturbances  that have
their origins  elsewhere  in the  trading  world.  In  particular,  a small  open economy  engaging
in free trade  (and  capital  movements)  will  be  exposing  itself  to  uncertain  terms  of trade
(and interest  rates).  Of course  if the small  open  economy  faces  a complete  set of
contingent  commodity  markets  in  the  Arrow-Debreu  sense,  the  argument  in favor  of the
optimality  of free  trade  is unaffected.  But  in the  real  world  of incomplete  markets,  a
general  answer as  to the  expected  welfare  impact  of trade  restrictions  cannot  be  given.
However,  to  the extent  that uncertainties  can  originate  in the  home  economy  as  well  as  the
10rest  of  the  world,  opening  the  economy  to  foreign  trade  offers  insurance  against  risks
originating  at  home.  For  example,  the  ability  to  import  from  the  rest-of-the-world  reduces
the  risk  associated  with  crop  failures  at  home  as  long  as  such  failures  are  not  correlated
with  those  abroad.
The  problem  of  adjustment  to  shocks  should  be  conceptually  distinguished  from  the  issue  of
whether  or  not  to  trade  in  a  world  in  which  the  exogenous  variables  of  an  economy  (such  as
its  terms  of  trade,  if  it  is  a  small  open  economy)  are  uncertain  but  have  a  known  objective
or  perceived  probability  distribution.  One  definition  of  an  external  shock,  though  not  a
universally  accepted  one,  is  that  it  is  an  unanticipated,  temporary  or  permanent,  change  in
(the  joint  probability  distribution)  of  one  or  more  exogenous  variables  to  the  economy.
Adjustment  to  a  shock  then  can  be  defined  as  changes  in  the  time  path  of  endogenous
variables,  in  particular,  policy  instruments  that  are  occasioned  by  the  shock.  Given  some
indicator  of  the  cost  of  adjustment,  one  could  compare  alternative  policy  responses  to  the
shock.  The  development  strategy  pursued  by  a  country  will  affect  its  adjustment  process.
One  strategy  as  compared  with  another  may  expand  the  set  of  feasible  policy  responses  to  a
given  shock  and,  as  such,  will  be  better  from  the  point  of  view  of  adjustment  regardless  of
how  the  cost  of  adjustment  is  defined.  Even  if  such  a  strong  ranking  of  two  strategies  is
not  always  possible,  one  can  compare  them  given  an  indicator  of  adjustment  costs.
One  could  view,  as  Neary  did  in  his  lucid  analysis,  the  problem  of  adjustment  as  tracing
the  consequences  of  an  exogenous  shock  to  an  initial  (steady  state)  equilibrium  of  an
economy  until  a  new  equilibrium  is  reached  (52).  Loosely  speaking,  the  process  by  which
the  economy  reaches  a  new  equilibrium  once  it  is  out  of  an  initial  equilibrium  can  be
specified  in  alternative  ways  depending  on  the  flexibility  with  which  resources  move
between  sectors,  the  time  horizon  involved,  and  the  policy  instruments  used  to  influence
the  process.  Again  as  Neary  argues,  while  conceptually  such  an  analysis  is  appealing,  the
fact  that  in  the  real  world  the  economy  is  likely  to  be  bombarded  by  a  sequence  of  shocks,
each  one  coming  before  the  adjustment  to  all  the  earlier  ones  have  completely  worked
themselves  out,  makes  analysis  of  the  efficacy  and  welfare  cost  of  particular  policy
interventions  or  of  development  strategies  in  the  adjustment  process  particularly
difficult.
A  number  of  studies  at  the  World  Bank  by  Balassa  (2,3,4,5)  and  Mitra  (50,51)  view  the  OPEC
induced  increase  in  real  oil  prices  of  1973  and  1979  and  the  increase  in  real  interest
costs  of  international  borrowing  in  the  early  eighties  as  shocks.  They  attempt  to  quantify
these  shocks  as  they  affect  different  countries  and  compare  their  adjustment  policies  in
terms  of  certain  indicators.  Balassa  concludes  from  such  a  comparison  that  developing
countries  pursuing  an  outward-oriented  development  strategy  were  more  successful  in  their
adjustment.  While  this  is  in  many  ways  a  comforting  conclusion,  there  are  some  problems
with  the  approach  that  is  used  in  arriving  at  such  a  conclusion.
Balassa  defines  adjustment  policies  as  responses  to  external  (or  internal)  shocks  that  have
as  their  objective  the  regaining  of  the  pre-shock  growth  path  of  the  national  economy.
Such  a  definition  presumes  that  regaining  the  pre-shock  growth  path  is  not  only  feasible
but  also  optimal  in  the  sense  of  minimizing  the  costs  (or  maximizing  the  gains,  in  the  case
of  favorable  shocks)  of  adjustment.  Although  Balassa's  definition  of  external  shocks  as
"unanticipated  changes  in  world  economic  conditions"  is  not  too  different  from  the
definition  given  above,  his  methodology  of  quantifying  shocks  involves  the  assumption  of
static  expectations.  Thus,  any  difference  in  a  country's  average  terms  of  trade  during  the
shock-adjustment  periods  (1974-78  and  1979-83)  compared  with  the  average  during  the
immediate  pre-shock  periods  (1971-73  and  1976-78)  is  viewed  as  the  magnitude  of  a
terms-of-trade  shock.  Similarly,  the  difference  between  the  average  interest  rates  during
1976-78  and  the  average  during  1979-83  is  viewed  as  the  magnitude  of  an  interest  rate
shock.  The  magnitude  of  the  shock  to  foreign  demand  for  a  country's  export  is  identified
as  any  deviation  from  its  pre-shock  share  in  the  trend  value  of  world  exports.  It  is  not
easy  to  specify  the  anticipated  or  expected  path  (or  more  precisely  the  stochastic  process)
11of  the  exogenous  variables  so  that  departures  from  it  could  be  deemed  a  shock.  But,  it
seems  somewhat  of  an  extreme  to  postulate  static  expectations.  Adjustment  policies
consisted  of  export  promotion  (increases  in  export  market  shares),  increased  borrowing
(relative  to  past  trends),  import  substitution  (decreases  in  income  elasticity  of  import
demand  compared  with  the  period  1963-73),  and  deflation  (reduction  in  income  growth
relative  to  the  1963-73  trend).
Mitra  quantifies  shocks  through  an  open  economy  macroeconomic  model  of  each  country  studied
(50,51).  The  model  was  estimated  using  annual  data  for  1963-81  and  introduced  a  dummy
variable  in  the  slopes  and  intercepts  of  each  of  the  four  structural  equations  of  the  model
to  distinguish  the  shock  and  adjustment  period  1974-81  (dummy  taking  the  value  1) from  the
pre-shock  period  of  1963-73  (dummy  taking  the  value  zero).  The  predictions  from  the  model
for  the  period  1974-81  are  compared  with  the  predictions  for  the  same  period  obtained  by
assuming  that  the  coefficients  of  the  slope  and  intercept  dummy  were  zero,  that  assuming
that  the  pre-shock  structure  prevailed  in  the  post-shock  period  and  that  there  was  no  shock
to  the  exogenous  variables.  The  difference  in  the  two  predictions  for  each  of  the  relevant
macroeconomic  variables  is  the  impact  of  the  shock.  It  is  then  decomposed  through
straightforward  accounting  into  price  and  quantity  changes.
The  exogenous  variables  were  (1)  the  trend  value  of  the  export  and  trade-weighted  average
of  GDP  in the  three  most important trading  partners of  a country,  2) the index  of  the
price  of  its  exports  relative  to  the  price  of  manufactured  exports  of  OECD  countries  (that
is  a  deflator  of  nominal  export  earnings  used  to  obtain  its  purchasing  power),  (3)  the
index  of  the  price  of  its  imports  relative  to  the  same  numeraire,  (4)  real  investment,  and
(5)  real  net  factor  income  from  abroad.  Absence  of  shock  is  assumed  to  imply  that  the
first  variable  continued  along  its  1961-73  trend  in  the  first  period,  the  second  and  third
stayed  at  their  1971-73  values,  share  of  real  investment  in  real  GNP  stayed  at  its  1971-73
value,  and  real  factor  income  in  the  first  shock  period  equaled  its  actual  value.  Thus,
Mitra's  counterfactual  is  a  combination  of  Balassa's  static  expectations  and  extrapolation
of  past  trends  with  respect  to  some  variables  and  perfect  foresight  in  respect  to  real
factor  incomes.
Mitra  groups  countries  into  five  groups  according  to  their  modes  of  adjustment.  Group  1
(Chile,  Costa  Rica,  the  Philippines,  Singapore,  South  Korea,  and  Taiwan)  adjusted
principally  through  export  expansion  and  public  resource  mobilization  (that  is,  policies
affecting  the  response  of public  consumption  and  revenues  to  income).  Group  2  (Argentina,
Brazil,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  India,  Kenya,  Malawi,  Mali,  Thailand,  Turkey,  and  Uruguay)
relied  on  either  export  expansion  or  public  resource  mobilization.  Group  3  (Jamaica,
Portugal,  and  Yugoslavia)  adjusted  through  import  substitution  and  negative  public  resource
mobilization.  Group  4  (El  Salvador,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Pakistan,  and  Spain)  resorted  to
financing  without  domestic  adjustment.  The  last  group  (Benin,  Bolivia,  Colombia,
Indonesia,  the  Ivory  Coast,  Malaysia,  Niger,  Nigeria,  and  Tunisia)  was  lucky  enough  to  have
experienced  favorable  shocks.  The  underlined  countries  in  each  group  are  semi-industrial,
and  their  adjustment  to  shock  is  analyzed  in  Mitra  (51).
The  magnitude  of  the  shocks  and  the  adjustments  as  per  the  Balassa  and  Mitra  methodologies
are  shown  in  tables  4  and  5.  I  very  much  agree  with  Balassa's  a  priori  arguments  that
outward-oriented  economies  are  better  placed  to  adjust  to  external  shock  even  though  the
very  fact  that  they  are  integrated  to  a  greater  extent  with  the  rest-of-the-world  than  the
inward-oriented  ones  tend  to  magnify  their  external  shocks.  For  instance,  in  the
inward-oriented  economies,  the  import  control  regimes  usually  would  have  succeeded  in
eliminating  all  imports  other  than  those  related  to  the  operation  and  expansion  of
productive  capacity  (mostly  industrial  and  infrastructural  capacity),  and  in  establishing
high  cost,  uneconomically  sized  plants  producing  domestic  substitutes.  It  is  also  likely
that  their  steps  toward  attenuating  some  of  the  deleterious  effects  of  excessive  import
substitution  through  export  promotion  are  also  likely  to  involve  direct  subsidization  of
12Table 4--External  shocks and  policy repsonses to  those shocks  for groups of  developing economies
Terms of  Export  External  Interest  Together  Additional  Export  Import  Effects
trade  volume  shock  rate  net external  promotion  substitution  of  lower
Item  effects  effects  total  effect  financing  GDP growth
--------- Percent  of GNP----------------Percent  of  external  shock---------
Outward-oriented:
NIC's--
1974-78  6.5  2.9  9.4  - - 9.4  -50.1  54.0  71.7  24.4
1979-83  8.9  6.1  15.0  1.8  16.8  -24.7  29.3  29.1  66.3
LDC's--
1974-78  5.9  1.2  7.0  - - 7.0  57.0  29.8  11.5  1.7
1979-83  7.0  1.4  8.4  1.3  9.7  53.3  27.5  1.6  17.6
NIC's and  LDC's--
1974-78  6.3  2.4  8.8  - - 8.8  -26.5  48.7  58.5  19.4
1979-83  8.4  4.9  13.3  1.7  15.0  -11.5  29.0  24.5  58.1
Inward-oriented:
NIC's--
1974-78  3.6  .8  4.5  - - 4.5  58.5  -13.6  41.2  13.9
1979-83  2.1  .4  2.5  2.0  4.6  5.1  22.8  15.4  56.7
LDC's--
1974-78  3.4  1.0  4.4  - - 4.4  150.6  17.6  -36.5  3.5
1979-83  4.5  .9  5.4  .7  6.1  96.7  -9.0  -. 6  12.9
NIC's and  LDC's--
1974-78  3.6  .9  4.5  - - 4.5  89.0  -14.9  15.4  10.5
1979-83  2.8  .6  3.4  1.6  5.0  37.6  11.5  9.8  41.2
- - =  Not applicable.
Source:  Private communication from B.  Balassa.
nontraditional exports,  while  continuing  to  penalize  their  traditional exports.  This  means
that  when  an  external  shock  hits  the  economy  very  few  imports  can  be  cut  without
jeopardizing  growth  and  further  import  substitution  or  export  promotion  (the  same  lines  as
before  the  shock)  can  be  achieved  only  by  increasing  costs.  Thus,  inward  orientation  can
substanitially  increase  the  cost  of  adjustment.
It  is  not  clear,  however,  whether  the  increased  cost  of  inward  orientation  can  be  inferred
from  the  a  posteriori  results  of  table  4.  After  all  is  said  and  done,  these  portray  the
effects  on  two  sides  of  an  accounting  equation.  On  one  side,  external  shocks  affect  export
earnings,  import  payments,  and  interest  on  foreign  debt.  On  the  other  side,  adjustment
involves  financing  (without  domestic  adjustment),  domestic  adjustments  that  relate  to
export  supplies,  import  demands,  and  those  that  relate  to  components  of  GDP.  The  fact  that
components  relating  to  adjustment  differed  between  countries  does  not,  in  and  of  itself,
indicate  whether  all  modes  of  adjustment  were  feasible  for  all  countries,  and  even  more
important  is,  whether  a  particular  mode  was  more  or  less  costly  in  some  well-defined  sense
than  the  other.
13TabLe 5--Balance-of-payments effects  of  external  shocks and modes of  adjustment
as a  percentage of  local  currency,, gross national  product
Group I  Group II  Group III  Group IV  Group V
1974-78  1974-81  1974-78  1974-81  1974-78  1974-81  1974-78  1974-81  1974-78  1974-81
Percent
A.  External  shocks
1.  International price effects--








Sum (1a  +  Ib)
2. Recession-induced Effect--
a. Export  volume
b.  Import saving
Difference (=(i)-(ii))
3. Net  interest  rate effect:
a. Payments Effect--
(1)  Medium and  long term
(11)  Short  term
Sum (=C1) + (11)
b. Receipts Effect
Difference (=3a  - 3b)
4.  Total  Shock (=  1 +2+3)
B. Modes of adjustment
1. Trade Adjustment
a. Exort expansion
(1)  Direct  effect
(11)  Import  augmenting
effects
Difference (=(1)  - (11))
b.  Import  substitution
Ci)  Direct  effect
(ii)  Indirect  effect
Difference (CCI)  - (11))




Cl)  Public consump.
restraint
(11)  Tax  Incensification
Sum (=(1) +  (11))
Sum (= 2a +  2b)
3.  Investment  Slowdown
4.  Net Additional  Ext.  Financing

































- .63  - .45  -3.86 -3.24
-.37  - .37  -2.87  -2.34
















































































































































-.6.3  .02  -. 02  .25
.18  .55  -5.41  -5.23  .32  -. 13
.57  1.11  -2.19 -2.08  .31  .15
.87  .85  4.68  4.43  -3.32
.36  .38  3.38  3.13  -1.55
.50  .48  1.31  1.30  -1.77
1.07  1.59  -. 88  -. 78  -1.46







































































Source:  (50,TabLe 4.1).
Balassa  was  careful  to  define  his  indicator  of  success  of  adjustment as  GDP  growth  rate,
and  he  relates  the  adjustment  path  as  revealed  by  the  magnitude  of  different  components  in
table  3  to  growth  performance.  Yet,  without  a  well  specified  model  of  the  relationship
between  the  set  of  feasible  paths  of  adjustment  and  the  development  strategy  adapted  by  a
country,  it  is  hard  to  assess  his  argument  that  in  response  to  the  initial  shock  of  1973
the  outward-oriented  economies  did  not  increase  their  external  debt  but  relied  on  output
increasing  polices  of  export  promotion  and  import  substitution  after  initially  deflating
their  economies.  Table  4  reveals  the  dominant  response  of  outward-oriented  LDC's  was
external  financing  and  import' substitution  played  a  minor  role.  In  the  case  of
outward-oriented  NIC's,  deflation  was  the  dominant  mode  of  adjustment  in  1979-83.  Even
when  the  outward-oriented  NIC's  and  LDC's  are  put  together,  the  dominant  response  in
1979-83  is  not  output-raising  policies  but  the  output-reducing  policies  of  lower  GDP
growth.
14
I  ternThe  analysis  of  Mitra  is,  based  on  a  macroeconomic  structural  model  that  incorporates  a
behavioral  response  to  the  evolution  of  exogenous  variables  (and  with  the  break  in  the
structure,  after  1973)  as  well  as  to  shocks  in  their  evolution.  The  structural  system  is
driven  only  by  gross  national  income  (corrected  both  for  capital  gains  and  losses  on  net
debt  as  well  as  terms-of-trade  changes).  This  is  admittedly  a  simple  framework  for
analyzing  adjustments.  He  concludes  that  in  many  semi-industrial  countries  attempts  to
adjust  to  exogenous  external  shocks  were  compromised  by  domestic  public  sector  profligacy
and  the  use  of  exchange  rate  policy  to  counter  inflation  generated  by  such  profligacy  was
counter  productive.  These  are  of  important  policy  significance,  if  they  are  confirmed  by  a
more  elaborate  analysis  including  more  countries.
Some  Recent  Theoretical  Models  of  Trade  and  Development
Rent-Seeking  and DUP  Activities
It was  noted  that policy  instruments  used  to  implement an  inward-oriented  strategy  of
development  are likely  to trigger  rent-seeking  activities.  Since Anne  Krueger's  (39)
classic  article  on  the diversion  of resources  toward rent  seeking,  an analytical  framework
for integrating  such  activities,  which  have  been  characterized  by  Bhagwati  (9)  as  DUP
(directly  unproductive  profit-seeking  activities),  into traditional  models of  trade  theory
has  emerged.  With  this framework,  a  number  of diverse  theoretical  results  and empirical
observations  (such  as  immiserizing  growth  (7),  negative  value  added  at  world  prices  of
heavily  protected  domestic  activities  in  developing  countries,  negative  shadow  prices  for
factors  in  project evaluation,  the  impact  of rent  and revenue  seeking  on domestic  welfare
and,  on  the  ranking  alternative  policy  interventions  for achieving  noneconomic  objectives)
can  all  be seen  as  arising from basically  the same  underlying  structural  feature  of a
distorted  economy.  Thus,  given  an existing  distortion  (such  as  an import  tariff  in  a small
open economy  or some  other nonoptimal  tax),  any  addition  to  factor  supplies  through
accumulation  or diversion  of factors  from  their existing  use  toward  a project  (or  for rent
seeking,  revenue  seeking  and  lobbying)  can  reduce  welfare.  This  can  be  seen  in the  case  of
immerizing  growth,  by  accentuating  the  effects  of that distortion  or  improve  welfare  and,
in  the case  of  negative  shadow  price  for a factor,  by  attenuating  them.  It  also  turns  out
that if  the diversion  of resources  to  rent seeking  are of the  same  value  in  equilibrium  as
the  rents  sought,  then  a policy,  such  as  an import  tariff, which  has  a  higher  welfare  cost
in  the absence  of  revenue  seeking  than  a production  tax for achieving  a noneconomic
objective  of raising  the output  of a sector  (beyond  the  level  achieved  in  a laissez-faire
equilibrium),  can  become  superior  to  it with  revenue  seeking  present  (1J4).
One  implication  of the  presence  of  rent seeking  was  already  mentioned.  The  gains  to  those
policies  that eliminate  distortion  that  triggered  the rent  seeking  could  be
substantially  greater  than  the  cost estimates  of the  same  distortion  in the  absence  of  rent
seeking.  If  we  also  include  the  resources  devoted  to  lobbying  for the  adoption  of  the
distortionary  policy  in the  cost of distortion,  it  can  be  substantial.  This  is  easily
illustrated  by using  the traditional approach  to  the cost  of protection.  In figure  1, AB
represents  the  production  possibility  (PP)  curve  of a small open  economy  if all  its
resources  are devoted  to  production activities.  C*D*  represents an  iso-value  line  at world
prices.  The  economy  will  operate  at P* under free  trade.  If a  tariff is  imposed  by  the
government  without anyone  lobbying  for  its  imposition  or for the  diversion  of  revenues  it
generates  once  imposed,  the  iso-value  line  becomes  CtDt and  the economy  will  produce  at Pt
and  the production  cost  of  protection  is  measured  by the  difference  ED*  between  the value
at world  prices  of  P*  as  compared  with  pt.  Now,  first introduce lobbying  for  the  tariff
rather than it being  imposed  autonomously.  The  resources  diverted to  the  lobbying  activity
(which  remains diverted  because  a tariff once  imposed  may  not  remain in  place  unless  the
lobby  continues  to  plead  for  it) shrinks the PP  curve  to  A'B'  and  the  production point
shifts to  p't.  If  there is  resource  using  struggle  for the  disposition  of  the revenue
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generated  by  the  tariff,  the  PP  curve  shrinks  further  to  A"B" and  the  production  point
moves  to  P"t.  The  total  production  cost  of  protection  then  is  E"D*,  consisting  of  the  sum
of cost of revenue  seeking  E"E',  the  cost of lobbying  for the  tariff  E'E, and  the
traditional  cost ED*.
If  rent  seeking  had  the effect of reducing  the cost  of the  distortion that  triggered  it  as
in some  of the  examples  above,  the gains from  elimination of the  distortion  may  be  less.
Indeed,  some  forms of corruption and  extra  legal  transactions  in developing  countries  and
some  centrally  planned  economies  may even  improve  the  efficiency of an otherwise  extremely
inefficient bureaucratic  allocation system.  In  such  cases,  the economic  gains  toward  a
less  bureaucratic  allocation  system may  be  less  than  what  might  seem  on  the surface.
North-South  Models
The  so  called north-south  models build  on  assumed  structural difference  between  the
developed  north and developing  south.  In the  Findlay version,  each  region  is specialized
in producing  its export  good (28). The north  produces  a single homogeneous  manufactured
goods  under  a constant  returns  to  scale neoclassical  technology  with capital  and  labor  as
inputs, saves  a fixed proportion of its output,  and fully employs  its exponentially growing
labor force  in a competitive  market for goods  as  factors.  The part of  the output  that is
not saved  or invested  is spent  either  on domestic  manufacturers  or  on  imports of primary
products from  the  south.  South's technology  for the  production of exports  is again
neoclassical with  capital and  labor  as  inputs,  except  that  labor  supply to  the  export
sector  is infinitely elastic  at a fixed product wage.  Southern  workers  consume  all  their
wages,  and  capitalists  save  part  of their profits.  Consumption  expenditures  of  workers  and
capitalists are  divided  between  spending  on  home  produced  primary  products and  imported
manufacturers,  depending  upon  relative  prices.
A unique  steady-state  equilibrium  in which  north and  south grow  at  a rate  equal  to  the
growth  rate  of the  effective  supply of labor  in the  north is shown  to  exist.  Also,
convergence  to this  steady state  from arbitrary  initial  conditions  is  established.  The
comparative  dynamics  (that  is,  impact  on the  steady-state equilibrium)  of increases  in the
northern  propensity  to  save  and  improvements  in its technology  are  simply  that its  per
16capita  income  increases  and  its  terms  of  trade  improve,  while  the  south  loses  on  both
counts.  As  Findlay  himself  admits,  the  assumptions  of  the  model  such  as  the  absence  of
capital  mobility  in  response  to  differing  profit  rates  between  north  and  south,  production
specialization,  and  unlimited  labor  supply  at  a  fixed  real  wage  in  the  south  are  very
restrictive.  I  would  add  the  exogenously  specified  savings  propensities  and  population
growth  rates  to  his  list.  But  the  fundamental  problem  is  that  while  these  rigidities  and
fixities  may  make  some  sense  in  the  short  or  even  medium  run,  to  keep  them  fixed  forever
and  take  the  comparative  dynamics  of  the  long-run  steady  states  emerging  from  them  as
stylized  development  stories  is  seriously  misleading.  Besides  the  intertemporal  gains  or
losses  along  the  transitional  path  toward  the  new  steady  state  are  ignored  in  focusing
exclusively  on  the  steady  state.  Such  gains  or  losses  may  reverse  the  conclusions  derived
from  steady-state  comparisons.
Another  north-south  model  that builds  in  even  more  rigidities  than  Findlay's  is  attributed
to  Kaldor  (71).  In  this  model,  the  north  is  specialized  in  producing  an  industrial output,
using  capital  and  labor  in  fixed  proportions  to  output.  Real  wages  are  exogenous  and
fixed,  and  any  surplus  of  output  over  sales  to  the  southern  and  northern  consumption  is
invested.  The  south  is  specialized  in  producing  an  agricultural  good,  using  land,  labor,
and  capital.  Capital-labor  ratio  is  fixed.  In  the  short  run  and  intermediate  run,
diminishing  returns arising  from  the  fixity  of  land  are  assumed  absent  so  that  the
capital-output  ratio in  agriculture  is  constant.  In  the  long  run,  substitution  (at  a
diminishing  marginal  rate)  between  land  and  labor  is  allowed.  Southern  real  wage  is  also
fixed  (in  terms  of  the  agricultural  good).  Wages  and  rents  are  consumed  in  agricultural
goods,  while  all  profits  are  invested.  Thus,  the  agricultural  surplus  of  the  south  is
exchanged  for  northern capital  goods.  Northern  workers  do  not  save  but  split  their
consumption  between  the  industrial  good  and  agricultural  good,  depending  on  relative
prices.
It  is  shown  that  in  the  short  run,  with  given  stocks  of  capital  in  the  north  and  south,  the
two  regions  do  not  grow  at  the  same  rate,  the  two  growth  rates  are  determined  by  the
equilibrium  terms  of  trade,  with  more  favorable  terms  of  trade  for  the  south  leading  to  its
faster  growth.  In  the  medium  run,  the  equilibrium  capital  stocks  as  well  as  the  terms  of
trade  are  jointly  determined.  The  two  capital  stocks  grow  at  the  same  equilibrium  rate
depending  on  capital  productivity  in  the  two  regions  and  on  their  share  of  consumption  in
output.  In  the  long  run,  the  growth  rate  of  the  system  is  the  same  as  that  of  the
effective  stock  of  agricultural  land.  Another  feature  of  this  model  is  that  adjustments  to
an  exogenous  fall  in  southern  productivity  may  involve  overshooting  in  the  sense  that  the
terms  of  trade  rise  above  their  medium-run  equilibrium  value  and  gradually  fall  toward  it.
Further,  the  path  toward  longrun  equilibrium  value  of  the  ratio  of  capital  stocks  in  the
two  regions  and  the  land  to  capital  ratio  in  the  south  may  involve  cyclical  behavior.  The
overshooting  and  cyclical  adjustment  are  viewed  by  Vines  as  formally  establishing  Kaldor's
indictment  of  the  price  mechanism  as  a  perverse  and  slow  acting  mechanism  that  creates
unnecessary  cycles  in  world  industrial  activity.  As  in  Findlay's  model,  the  extreme
assumptions  of  this  model  appear  to  be  ill  suited  to  an  analysis  of  the  long-run
development  process  (71).
Vines  and  Kanbur  (7.2)  use  a  simpler  version  of  the  Vines  model  in  which  southern  output  of
agriculture  is  price-inelastic  and  northern  macroeconomy  is  Keynesian  to  argue  that
benefits  to  the  stabilization  of  agricultural  prices  through  a  buffer  stock  operation  can
yield  substantial  benefits  to  the  north  if  northern  real  wages  are  sticky.  Buffer  stock
operation  avoids  a  deflationary  policy  that would  otherwise  be  necessary  to  contain
inflation  whenever  agricultural  prices  rise  because  of  harvest  failure  in  the  south.  By
ignoring  private  stock  operations  and  the  role  of  price  expectations,  speculation,  and  by
exaggerating  the  inflexibilities  in  the  system  (besides  real  wage  inflexibilities)  through
the  assumption  of  fixed  propensities,  the  model  is  likely  to  exaggerate  the  gains  that
accrue  from  publicly  funded  buffer  stocks.
17Recent  Models  of  International  Trade
Turning  now  to  developments  in  the  theory  of  international  trade,  only  two  will  be  briefly
noted.  One  is  the  application  of  Neo-Ricardian  time-phased  models  and  neo-Marxian  analysis
(under  the  broad  theme  of  unequal  exchange)  of  international  trade.  Evans  offers  a
perceptive  critique  of  these  models  (8).  The  second  is  the  intellectual  arbitrage  between
industrial  organization  theory  and  international  trade  theory  by  Krugman  and  Helpman
(38,43,44,45)  and  others.  Stewart  has  attempted  to  derive  some  implications  for  the  south
from  this  theory  (68).
The  time-phased  Ricardian  models  are  viewed  by  their  builders  as  repairing  what  they
consider  two  damaging  features  of  traditional  models  of  trade  and  growth,  namely,  their
treatment  of  capital  as  a  homogeneous  aggregate  and  their  ignoring  the  time  lags  involved
in  production.  By  adopting  Von-Neumann's  formulation  of  production  in  terms  of  activities
that  transform  a  vector  of  inputs  into  a  vector  of  outputs  one  period  later,  they  address
both  these  concerns.5
They focus  only  on the  steady  state (the  state of balanced  growth)  of the  system.  The  two
conclusions of  this theory  are worth  nothing:  first,  for a small open  economy  the  steady
state associated  with  autarky (or  with restrictions  on international  trade)  may  yield
higher  consumption  every  period  than  that associated  with free  trade;  and  second,  the
commodity  pattern of  trade  can  change  along  the  approach  to  the  steady state.  Indeed  it
can  be  reversed;  a commodity  exported  at  one  point can  be  imported  at  another.  It should
be  noted  that  neither conclusion  depends  on  the  Ricardian  time-phased  structure  of  the
model:  a standard  two-commodity,  two-factor,  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  model  in  its  dynamic
version  in  which one  of  the commodities  is  an investment  good  and  with  no-time  lags  in
production  can  be  used  to  derive  them.  The  fact that trade  restrictions  lead  to  higher
consumption  than  free  trade  in  a steady state  does not  imply  that restricting  trade  is
intertemporally  optimal.  Indeed,  the  contrary  is  true  for a small  open economy  under free
trade  (17,59).
In  the literature  on  unequal  exchange  (27),  the north  is the  center  and  the  south  is the
periphery.  The process  of international  exchange  and investment  is  assumed  to  equalize  the
rate  of return  to capital in  the center  and  the periphery.  The  return  to labor  is  not
equalized,  and  this  inequality  is  alleged  to  grow.  Since  the  exchange  between  the  center
and the  periphery  is  voluntary,  it  is  not  clear that  unequal  wages  between  regions  should
be  viewed  as  indicating  that the  commodity  exchange  itself  is  unequal.  However,  if one  is
prepared  to define  suitably  the content  of "socially  necessary  labor" in commodities  being
exchanged  (using  a model  that  will enable  one  to  do  so  unambiguously),  one  can  arrive  at  a
precise  definition  of "unequal exchange"  as  exchange  of  commodities  of  unequal  content  of
socially  necessary  labor.  Roemer  follows  this  route (5).  Few  would  be  bold enough  to
infer policy  relevant  conclusions  from  the existence  of  unequal  exchange  in  the  sense  of
Roemer.
The  intellectual  arbitrage  between  industrial  organization  theory  and  international  trade
theory  came  about initially  as  an attempt  to explain  (better  than conventional  theory)
certain stylized  facts of international  trade.  These  facts  were:  first, even  at the  most
5The  issue of heterogeneity  of capital attracted some  extensive  attention in the so called  Cambridge (MA)  versus
Cambridge (England)  controversies in capital theory.  A few  of the uninformed  have somehow  come  to  the conclusion  that
neoclassical  economic  theory stands or falls  on the validity of the homogeneity  of capital.  Malinvaud  in his seminal
paper on capital accumulation  had, among  other things, given  a perfectly rigorous meaning for the concept  of marginal
productivity  of capital  in a model  in which  capital goods  were heterogeneous  (48).  This paper apparently was not  read
by many  of the Neo-Ricardians or Sraffians.  Hahn lucidly  exposes  the misunderstanding and confusion  that surround the
Neo-Ricardian  discussion  of the neoclassical  economics  (33).
18disaggregated  level,  the  trade  among  industrialized  countries  appear  to  consist  largely  of
intraindustry  trade,  each  country  exporting  as  well  as  importing  commodities  that  would  be
classified  as  falling  within  the  same  industrial  category;  second,  significant  economies  of
scale  in  production  appeared  to  characterize  the  technology  of  some  of  these  industries;
and  third,  such  industries  in  many  countries  appeared  to  be  highly  concentrated,  often  with
very  few  firms.  Recent  theories  explain  the  above  stylized  facts  by  drawing  on  the  model
of  monopolistic  competition  in  an  industry  producing  a  set  of  differentiated  products  under
increasing  returns  to  scale  and  setting  it  in  the  context  of  international  trade.  An
interesting  result  is  that  in  contrast  to  traditional  theories,  gainful  exchanges  will
arise  even  between  two  economies  that  are  identical  in  every  respect.  Given  economies  of
scale,  each  country  will  produce  a  different  set  of  (differentiated)  products  of  the  same
industry,  but  consumers  in  each  will  be  able  to  buy  products  produced  in  both.  This  raises
consumer  welfare  in  both  countries,  compared  with  what  could  be  achieved  by  each  country
under  autarky.  A  consequence  of  the  oligopolistic  equilibrium  that  characterizes
international  exchange  in  some  of  the  models  is  that  it  would  be  in  the  interest  of  each
country  to  attempt  to  capture  more  of  the  oligopolistic  rents  that  arise  from  the
divergence  between  equilibrium  prices  and  marginal  costs.  This  brings  in  a  role  for  active
strategic  trade  interventions  that  is  not  present  in  traditional  theories.
The  implications  of  the  above  for  the  developing  countries  are  far  from  obvious.  First,
the  case  for  strategic  intervention  and  the  type  of  intervention  are  very  sensitive  to  the
specification  of  the  model  and  the  concept  of  the  equilibrium  used.  Second,  the  arguments
for  trade  interventions  that  the  new  theory  allows  cannot  to  be  taken  as  analytical  support
for  the  particular  interventions  that  developing  countries  have  imposed  in  totally
different  contexts.  Starting  from  the  premise  that  few  developing  countries  will  be  able
to  establish  a  viable  industry  producing  differentiated  products  under  economies  of  scale,
Stewart  has  suggested  that  the  south  as  a  group  could,  however,  do  so  if  each  country
specialized  in  one  or  at  most  a  few  products  and  traded  them  with  each  other.  This
argument  for  the  south-south  trade,  however,  does  not  follow  the  above  theory,  except  in
that  there  is  a  common  assumption  that  the  greater  the  variety  of  products  consumed,  the
greater  is  consumer  welfare.  Since  the  argument  also  assumes  protection  against  imported
products  of  the  same  industry  from  the  north,  it  really  involves  diverting  northern  trade
and  creating  trade  among  southern  countries.  There  is  no  presumption  that  this  is
necessarily  welfare  improving  for  the  south.
Trade  among  the  developed  industrialized  economies  with  similar  tastes,  technologies,  and
factor  endowments  is  largely  intra-industry,  two-way  trade  (and  this  is  the  starting  point
of  newer  theories  of  trade);  however  significant  intra-industry  trade  takes  place  among
developing  countries  as  well.  Havrylyshyn  and  Civan  find  in  a  regression  analysis  that  per
capita  income  and  the  diversity  of  manufactured  goods  exports,  besides  membership  in  a
successful  trading  group  (such  as  the  EC),  explain  a  significant  proportion  of  the
variation  in  intra-industry  trade  among  countries  (3.4).  The  stage  of  development  matters.
While  60-80  percent  of  all  trade  in  industrialized  countries  is  intra-industry,  the
percentage  is  between  40-50  percent  in  the  newly  industrialized  countries  and  is  only
between  10-20  percent  in  other  developing  countries.  The  authors  argue  that  this  link  with
stage  of  development  of intra-industry  trade  in  differentiated  products  implies  that  as
development  proceeds  the  penetration  of  developing  countries  into  the  developed  country
markets  will  be  diffused  over  a  number  of  products.  As  such,  such  penetration  may  appear
less  threatening  and  invoke  less  of  a  protectionist  response  from  the  developed  countries.
This  is  not  entirely  convincing.  After  all  the  differentiated  products  presumably  come
from  the  same  set  of  industries  and  lobbying  for  protection  is  likely  to  be  industry  based
rather  than  product  based.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  such  lobbying  will  be
blunted.
A  few  words  about  trends  in  south-south  trade  are  in  order  in  concluding  this  section.  It
is  sometimes  suggested  by  Stewart  (6)  that  the  patterns  of  financial,  transport,  and
marketing  arrangements  developed  during  the  colonial  era  have  precluded  developing
19countries  from  changing  their  colonial  trade  patterns  to  trading  among  themselves  to
greater  mutual  benefit.  This  argument  is  not  valid  for  all  developing  countries,  if  it  is
at  all  valid  for  any.  For  example,  India  was  able  to  change,  fairly  soon  after  its
independence,  the  geographical  concentration  of  its  exports  from  the  United  Kingdom  to
other  developed  countries  (such  as  the  United  States  and  USSR),  although  not  as  much  to
other  developing  countries.  Havrylyshyn  and  Wolf  show  that  the  share  of  nonfuel  trade
among  developing  countries  did  not  change  between  1963  and  1977  (3).  However,  this
constant  share  is  the  sum  of  a  falling  share  of  manufacturers  and  a  rising  share  of  primary
products.  Furthermore,  they  did  not  find  any  bias  against  trade  among  developing  countries
other  then  the  effect  of  their  own  trade  restrictions.  Exports  of  manufacturers  from
developing  countries  to  other  developing  countries  are  found  to  be  more  capital-intensive
than  exports  to  developed  countries,  a  pattern  consistent  with  multicountry  generalizations
of  Heckscher-Ohlin  theory.  However,  the  pattern  may  also  have  been  influenced  by  trade
restrictions  in  developing  countries  (40).  It  is  not  clear,  however,  whether  promoting
south-south  trade  through  distortionary  restrictive  trading  arrangements  will  mean  that
gains  from  trade  creation  will  outweigh  the  losses  from  trade  diversion  and  distortions.
International  Factor  Movements
The welfare  implications  of  international  factor  mobility  have  been  analyzed  extensively  by
trade  theorists  in  the past  several  years.  The so  called brain-drain  from  developing
countries,  foreign investment  in  such  countries  and  the  use  of immigrant  labor  in declining
industries  in  developed countries,  as  a way  of reducing  labor  costs  in  an  attempt  to remain
viable  in the  face  of competition  from other  developing  countries  have  all  been  analyzed.
Models  used in  the  analysis have  been  varied,  including  the traditional  Heckscher-Ohlin
model,  the  specific  factors  model,  and  models  incorporating  increasing  returns  and
monopolistic  competition.  Even lobbying  activities  have  been  incorporated  in  the analysis.
First best  and second  best  policies  towards  factor  movements  have  also  received  attention.
In the  standard  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  (H-O-S)  two-factor,  two-commodity  small  open
economy  model,  under  conditiona  of free  trade  if foreign  investors  of imported  capital  (or
immigrant  laborers)  are  paid their marginal  value  product  in the  importing  country  and
these  returns  are repatriated,  such factor  imports  do not change  consumer  welfare  as  long
as  the  economy  remains  incompletely  specialized  before  and  after  the  import of  capital
(labor).  Welfare  increases  if the economy  becomes  specialized  in  the  capital  (labor)
intensive  good  after  capital  (labor)  imports  from  an  initial  position of  incomplete
specialization  (or specialization  in the  labor  (capital)  intensive  good).  In such  a
situation,  the  additional  capital  (labor)  import  at  the margin  reduces  the  economies
marginal  product,  thereby,  reducing  its  cost  in terms  of payments  to  intramarginal  units  of
foreign  capital  (labor).
Brecher  and Diaz-Alejandro  (20)  were  the  first  to show  that  the  above  favorable  welfare
consequences  of inflow  of foreign  factors  need  not  hold  if the economy  is  not  following  its
optimal  free  trade  policy.  Indeed,  given  an  existing  import  tariff,  if importables  are
capital  (labor)  intensive,  even if the  economy  is  not specialized  before  and after foreign
capital  (labor)  inflow,  there  is  a welfare  loss  associated  with factor  imports.  To  the
extent  developing  countries  protect their  capital-intensive  manufactures  and such
protection  induces  "tariff-jumping" foreign  investment,  the  Brecher  and Diaz-Alejandro
result points  to additional  welfare  loss  (over and  above  the  primary loss  associated  with
the  protective  tariff  in  the absence  of foreign investment)  that  inward-oriented  policies
generate.  Bhagwati  and Srinivasan  have  argued  that outward-oriented  policies,  on  the  other
hand,  are  likely  to attract welfare,  improving  foreign investment  that  takes advantage  of
relative  cheapness  of a country's  more  abundant factor  (1).
A  number of subsequent  studies  have  examined  the welfare  of  consequences  for the  home
economy  of alternate  trade  policies  (first best and  second  best)  in  the presence  of
20foreign-owned  factors  of  production  (11,19,63).  Other  authors  consider  the  choice  between
emigration  of  home  labor  (investment  abroad  of  home  capital)  and  attracting  foreign
investment  (attracting  foreign  workers).  They  extend  and  generalize  a  result  originally
due  to  Ramaswakmi  (53,54).  He  considered  a  model  in  which  a  single  homogeneous  commodity
was  produced  under  constant  returns  to  scale  in  two  countries  using  capital  and  labor  as
inputs.  Although  there  is  no  incentive  for  commodity  trade  in  this  model,  incentives  for
factor  movements  arise  because  of  different  factor  endowment  ratios  in  the  two  countries.
He  showed  that  for  the  capital  poor  country  that can  optimally  tax  earnings  of  foreign
capital  or  the  income  of  its  nationals  working  abroad,  the  optimal  policy  is  to  attract  and
tax  foreign  capital  rather than  let  home  workers  emigrate  and  tax  their  earnings.  This
result  or  variants  of  it  in  more  general  contexts  are  in  studies  by  Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan
(17),  Calvo  and  Wellisz  (23),  Jones,  Coelho  and  Easton  (38),  Wong  (74),  Saavedra-Rivano  and
Wooton  (57).  Except  for  Saavedra-Rivano  and  Wooton  who  worked  with  a  dynamic  north-south
model  of  the  Findlay  (28)  type,  the  analyses  of  the  above  authors  are  static.  Buiter  (21),
on  the  other  hand,  analyzes  the  pattern  of  capital  formation,  balance-of-payments  behavior,
and  welfare  in  a  dynamic,  two-country,  over-lapping  generation,  general  equilibrium  model
in  which  countries  differ  only  in  their  pure  rates  of  time  preference  and  there  is  perfect
international  capital  mobility.  With  a  positive  rate  of  natural  growth,  the  low-time
preference  country  runs  current  account  surplus  (exports  capital)  in  the  steady  state
though  not  necessarily  outside  it.  The  ranking  of  steady-state  utility  levels  under
autarky and  free  trade  and  capital  mobility  is  ambiguous.  Galor  (2)  independently  of
Buiter  uses  essentially  the  same  model  to  analyze  the  implications  of  international
migration.  He  finds  that  there  is  unilateral  migration  from  the  high-  (low)  time
preference  to  the  low-  (high)  time  preference  country  if  the  autarkic  steady-state
equilibrium  in  both  countries  is  characterized  by  under  (over)  investment  relative  to  the
Golden  Rule.  Bilateral  migration  occurs  if  the  two  countries  are  located  on  the  opposite
sides  of  the  Golden  Rule.  In  contrast  with  the  other  analyses  discussed  above,  Galor's
model  of  unilateral  migration  impoverishes  the  nonmigrants  in  the  immigration  country,
while  nonmigrants  in  the  emigration  country  are  no  worse  off.
Leontief  (45)  suggested  that  an  unilateral  transfer  of  income  from  one  country  to  another
in  a  two-country,  two-commodity,  pure-exchange  world  may  impoverish  the  recipient,  while
enriching  the  donor.  Samuelson  (58)  showed  that  such  a  possibility  cannot  arise  unless  the
equilibrium  is  Walrasian  stable.  This  so  called  transfer  paradox  has  recently  received
independent  attention  from  several  authors.  By  introducing  a  third  country  or  by
introducing  domestic  distortions,  one  can  resurrect  the  transfer  paradox  even  in  a  stable
equilibrium.  The  possibility  arises  that  both  the  donor  and  the  recipient  are  enriched  by
the  transfer.  However,  some  researchers  may  jump  to  the  conclusion  that  the  transfer
paradox  has  the  implication  that  foreign  aid  can  impoverish  developing  countries.  Such  a
conclusion  would  be  hasty,  in  part,  because  the  transfer-induced  change  in  equilibrium
terms  of  trade  on  which  the  paradox  depends  is  unlikely  since  aid  is  quantitatively  very
small  relative  to  the  value  of  global  trade  and,  in  part,  because  the  above  analyses
ignores  policy  responses  (such  as  removal  of  distortion)  that  can  negate  the  paradoxical
outcome.
One  particular  institutional  arrangement  under  which  international  investments  and
technology  transfer  have  taken  place  is  the  multinational  corporation,  which  has  received
theoretical  and  empirical  attention  (36).  For  brevity,  this  literature  and  that  on
direct-foreign  investment  (49)  are  not  discussed  here.
In  concluding  this  section,  recent  experience  with  international  migration  must  be
mentioned.  The  boom  in  the  oil  rich  west  Asian  countries  after  the  first  oil  shock  induced
a  substantial  emigration  of  labor  from  south  and  east  Asia,  as  well  as  the  Arab  world,  to
these  countries.  At  their  peak,  the  remittance  to  their  families  by  these  emigrant  workers
constituted  a  half  or  more  of  the  foreign  exchange  earnings  of  many  of  the  countries  of
origin.  With  the  decline  in  oil  prices  and  the  contraction  of  investment  in  oil-exporting
countries,  growth  in  the  use  of  immigrant  labor  in  these  countries  is  unlikely  in  the  near
21future  and,  in  fact,  the  net  flow  will  probably  turn  negative.  The  investment  of
remittances  by  the  families  of  emigrants  in  housing,  small  enterprises,  and  other
activities  has  transformed  some  parts  of  south  Asia  with  an  unusual  concentration  of  such
emigrants.  The  returning  emigrants  brought  with  them,  in  addition  to  their  savings,  the
skills,  knowledge,  and  an  altered  outlook  acquired  during  their  sojourn  abroad.  (70,75).
Conclusion
The development  of  sharper  theoretical  and  econometric  tools  and  the  accumulation  of a
large  and  growing  body of  economic  data relating  to developing  countries  have  enabled  a
number of analysis  to compare  outward-  and inward-oriented  strategies  of  development.  Most
analysts,  though  not all,  have  concluded  that countries  that  followed  an  outward-oriented
strategy  not only  did  better by  most indicators  of development  but  also  better  weathered
the  shocks  to  the  world  economy.  Recent  policy  changes  in the  two  giants  of  the developing
world  (India and China)  toward  economic  liberalization  suggest  that the  lessons  of three
decades  of development  have  been  learned.  Some  pessimists  argue  that  if the  two giants  and
the  rest of the  developing  countries  were  to  adopt  an  outward orientation,  it will
exacerbate  the  rising  tide of protectionism  in the  industrialized  world  besides  imposing
terms-of-trade  losses  on  the  developing  countries.  However,  given  the  fact that
manufactured  exports of  the developing  world  still accounts  for less  than  5 percent  of the
apparent  consumption  of  such  commodities  in  the developed  world,  and  the  recovery  in  the
industrialized  world  continues,  such  fears  seem  exaggerated.  This  is  not  to  say,  however,
that problems  cannot  arise  with  regard  to  particular commodities  or  countries.
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